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Note 
  
TO EACH HIS OWN JURY: DUAL JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS  
KAITLIN A. CANTY 
This Note explores the dual jury system in which each defendant in a 
joint trial has his or her own jury to decide guilt or innocence.  In 1968, in 
Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that despite any limiting 
instruction, a defendant’s right to confrontation is violated when an 
incriminating out-of-court confession is admitted against him when the 
confesser does not testify.  This decision called into question courts’ ability 
to try defendants jointly.  Shortly thereafter, courts began impaneling two 
juries simultaneously to decide the guilt or innocence of each defendant.  
This procedure was first approved by the federal courts in 1972 and has 
continued to withstand defendant challenges for nearly four decades.  In 
addition to remedying the dilemma stemming from Bruton, impaneling 
dual juries also is a way to promote judicial economy and grant partial 
severance based on antagonistic defenses.  Many courts, however, are 
reluctant to endorse the procedure despite their affirmation of convictions 
of defendants tried by dual juries.  This Note argues that courts should 
endorse the dual jury trial procedure.  It also urges the adoption of 
detailed guidelines to assist judges in implementing the dual jury practice 
and proposes a model of such guidelines.  
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TO EACH HIS OWN JURY:  DUAL JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS 
KAITLIN A. CANTY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Trial 
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”1  The 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution requires that criminal defendants 
“shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State.”2  The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to a jury has 
grown to be a “deep commitment of the Nation . . . in serious criminal 
cases.”3  Certainly, Americans consider trial by jury an essential freedom 
of citizenship and a check on government power.4  Perhaps because this 
right is so ingrained in society, proposed changes to the current system risk 
being met with stark criticism.  Reforms are often necessary, however, in 
order to achieve the dual goals of preserving defendants’ rights and 
ensuring speedy trials.5 
One such innovation to trial by jury is the multiple jury system in 
which each defendant in a joint trial has his or her own jury.  The 
procedure was used as early as 1914 in a California Court of Appeal case 
in which two defendants were convicted of murder.6  There, in response to 
defendants’ request for separate trials, the court simultaneously impaneled 
two separate juries.7  The defense counsel expressly stated in court that he 
did not object to the procedure, and as a result the appeals court refused to 
hear any argument that the defendants’ motion for a separate trial was 
denied or that they were prejudiced by the dual juries.8 
This so-called “experiment”9 of simultaneous juries was first examined 
                                                                                                                          
* Union College, B.A. 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.  I 
would like to thank the editors and members of the Connecticut Law Review for their suggestions 
during the editing process.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Karen and Ed, for their unending and 
unwavering love and support throughout all my endeavors.  All errors contained herein are mine alone. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is also 
applicable to state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
4 Id. at 155 (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression 
by the Government.”). 
5 See Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525, 528–29 (3d Cir. 1958) (“[T]he constitutional conception of 
jury trial is not inflexible in all details, so long as the essential elements of the institution are 
preserved.”); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970) (holding that a six-member jury 
did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
6 People v. Ho Kim You, 141 P. 950, 951 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914). 
7 Id. at 954. 
8 Id. at 954–55. 
9 United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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by the federal courts in 1972 in United States v. Sidman.10  In Sidman, the 
Ninth Circuit heard a challenge by a defendant that his dual jury trial 
denied him due process.11  In unanimously upholding the defendant’s 
conviction and the use of two juries,12  the court found that the defendant’s 
rights were preserved, but it also cautioned that its holding should not be 
construed as “a blanket endorsement” of the procedure.13  Nearly forty 
years have passed since the Sidman court upheld multiple juries as 
consistent with due process.  Since then, both federal14 and state15 courts 
have heard challenges to the procedure and have overwhelmingly affirmed 
defendants’ convictions.  Many courts, however, are still reluctant to 
endorse dual juries16 and little literature has been written on the practice 
over the last four decades.17 
                                                                                                                          
10 Id. at 1167–70. 
11 Id. at 1169. 
12 Id. at 1160, 1170. 
13 Id. at 1170. 
14 On the federal level, in addition to the Ninth Circuit, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits have also affirmed convictions of defendants tried by the use of multiple juries.  See 
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1100 (10th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1077–79 
(10th Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Dorsey, No. 00-2043, 2000 WL 1089502, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000); 
Mack v. Peters, 80 F.3d 230, 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 
823, 830–31 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 18–21 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 689–90 (6th Cir. 1975). 
15 See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Propriety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial of 
Multiple Defendants in State Criminal Prosecution, 41 A.L.R.6th 295 (2009) (collecting state cases). 
16 The majority of criticism comes from state courts.  See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152, 
1155 (Idaho 1985) (“While we conclude that the use of the dual jury system in the present case does 
not pose grounds for reversal, the potential for serious error in a complicated case may caution against 
its use.”); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding the two jury system not 
“particularly attractive”); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d 672, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) 
(“strongly condemning the use of dual juries”); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306, 313 (Nev. 1994) 
(rejecting an optimistic view of multiple juries and expressing that they can be “a breeding ground for 
confusion”); State v. Corsi, 430 A.2d 210, 213 (N.J. 1981) (concluding that “there are too many 
opportunities for reversible error to take place” and therefore refusing to recommend it); People v. 
Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989) (expressing reservations and recommending multiple 
juries “to be used sparingly and then only after a full consideration of the impact the procedure will 
have on defendants’ due process rights”); Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 458 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) 
(“[W]e would be remiss if we did not caution the trial courts in Oklahoma to bear in mind that the dual 
jury procedure has the potential for engendering error, especially in complex cases.”), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). 
17 The few articles that have been published on dual juries are relatively brief as well.  See Alex 
A. Gaynes, Two Juries/One Trial—Panacea of Judicial Economy or Personification of Murphy’s Law, 
5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285, 285–292 (1981) (discussing general background of the dual jury 
procedure and profiling United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), to show potential 
errors); Adam Hersh, Joint Criminal Trials with Multiple Juries: Why They Are Used and Suggested 
Ways to Implement Them, FLA. BAR J., Apr. 1999, at 72, 72–74 (discussing a general background of 
multiple jury trials and Florida’s use of the procedure); Judson W. Morris & Robert E. Savitt, Bruton 
Revisited—One Trial/Two Juries, PROSECUTOR, Nov.–Dec. 1976, at 92, 92–94 (discussing general 
background of dual juries and profiling a Los Angeles Superior Court case using dual juries); Marie G. 
Santagata, One Trial, Two Juries—It Works in Extraordinary Cases, N.Y. L.J., May 11, 1988, at 1, 32 
(reporting that the expected benefits of the dual jury system, including reduced burden on witnesses, 
reduced costs, and an efficient use of the court’s time, were all realized in People v. Ricardo B., 535 
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This Note argues that both state and federal courts should endorse dual 
jury trials and cease condemning the practice while simultaneously 
upholding convictions by multiple juries.  This Note will show the 
advantages of the procedure.  Dual juries are well tested in court, having 
withstood multiple defendants’ arguments over the last four decades.  To 
ease the transition to more uniform endorsement, each jurisdiction that has 
upheld convictions of defendants tried by multiple juries should adopt 
detailed guidelines, such as those in this Note, and incorporate them into 
their rules.   
Part II provides a broad overview of the dual jury system, including the 
various contexts in which dual juries have been employed, the authority 
courts have cited for impaneling dual juries, the standard of review courts 
have used to examine challenges to the practice, and rationales courts have 
advanced for using the procedure.  Part III argues that the advantages of 
the dual jury system outweigh the disadvantages, and accordingly, courts 
should move toward embracing multiple juries in the appropriate contexts.  
Several arguments frequently raised by defendants against dual juries and 
courts’ responses to these challenges will be examined.  This Part 
demonstrates that the procedure has been extensively tested in the courts 
and defendants’ challenges have been overwhelmingly rejected.  Part IV 
proposes detailed model guidelines that jurisdictions using multiple juries 
should adopt in order to achieve the appropriate balance between judicial 
economy and defendants’ rights.  Finally, Part V concludes with a brief 
summary of why more courts should impanel dual juries. 
II.  THE DUAL JURY SYSTEM EXPLORED 
The decisional authority reviewing dual juries is substantially greater 
in the criminal context, but recently one circuit has approved the use of 
dual juries in the civil context.18  Moreover, when faced with a motion to 
impanel dual juries, a court traditionally must evaluate two considerations.  
First, a court must determine whether it has authority to order dual juries.  
Second, a court must decide what standard of review to use.  In addition to 
examining these considerations, this Part concludes by discussing 
rationales for implementing the procedure. 
A.  Contexts in Which Dual Juries Have Been Impaneled 
Dual juries were first upheld by the federal circuit in 1972 in United 
                                                                                                                          
N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1989)); Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Codefendant Confessions and the Demise of 
Confrontation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1890–94 (1988) (discussing the benefits and procedural 
considerations of impaneling dual juries); Note, On the Joint Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling 
of Two Juries Simultaneously is Permissible, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 407–17 (1974) (providing a 
general background of dual juries and profiling United States v. Sidman). 
18 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 361 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 326 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:321 
States v. Sidman.19  In Sidman, both codefendants were convicted of armed 
robbery.20  The first state court case that could be found after 1972 to 
uphold the procedure was decided by the District Court of Appeal of 
Florida in 1978.21  In Feeney v. State,22 the court affirmed a defendant’s 
conviction of robbery by use of a firearm by a dual jury trial—even in the 
absence of cited authority to conduct the procedure—because the record 
did not indicate prejudice and there was substantial overlap in the evidence 
against both defendants.23  Further, the court noted that the law was 
evolutionary in nature and dual juries support this idea.24  Finally, the court 
noted the broad discretion that trial judges hold over their courts.25  That 
same year, the Superior Court of New Jersey found no prejudice in the 
“unorthodox” procedure of three juries in one trial and upheld a conviction 
of conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, and assault with intent to 
rob while armed.26  Other states followed in upholding convictions based 
on the procedure over the next three years.27  All of these cases were 
criminal cases—the predominant context in which dual juries are used by 
courts. 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a court 
may impanel multiple juries in a civil trial.  The matter arose when direct 
purchasers of high fructose corn syrup brought a class action suit against 
the principal manufacturers of the product alleging a price fixing 
conspiracy in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.28  The district 
court expressed its view that dual juries were favored in the case due to 
concerns over judicial economy and because limiting instructions would be 
                                                                                                                          
19 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972). 
20 Id. at 1160. 
21 Feeney v. State, 359 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).  In 1975, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana denied the state’s motion for a dual jury to resolve the dilemma where defendants were 
allowed to choose which state constitution to be tried under and each chose a different one.  State v. 
Thomas, 319 So. 2d 789, 792–93 (La. 1975).  The court there declined to impanel dual juries even 
when failing to do so resulted in severance in defiance of Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure.  Id. 
at 793.  The court “fe[lt] that [the procedure] would cause numerous other complications,” but did not 
provide any explanation of which “complications” they feared would occur.  Id. 
22 359 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
23 Id. at 570. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 State v. Hernandez, 394 A.2d 883, 884–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
27 See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding no prejudice and 
affirming defendant’s conviction for two counts of robbery and one count of murder in the second 
degree); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding authorization for the two 
jury procedure and affirming defendant’s conviction of murder and armed violence); Scarborough v. 
State, 437 A.2d 672, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no reversible error and thus upholding 
defendant’s conviction for robbery); People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 307–08 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) 
(approving the dual jury procedure and upholding conviction for breaking and entering); State v. Corsi, 
430 A.2d 210, 210–11, 213 (N.J. 1981) (finding no reversible error and affirming a conviction of 
conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery with a dangerous instrument, murder, and, with respect 
to one defendant, atrocious assault and battery). 
28 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 361 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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insufficient to overcome prejudicial evidence admissible against only one 
defendant.29  The court, unsure of its authority to impanel dual juries in 
antitrust cases, certified the question to the circuit court.30  Writing for a 
unanimous Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner31 held that there was no bar to 
the practice and even encouraged it:  “Imaginative procedures for averting 
jury error, as long as they do not violate any legal norm, are to be 
encouraged rather than discouraged.”32  Further, the court found the 
procedure to be “orthodox in criminal cases” and could not identify any 
reason why it should be met with disapproval in the civil context.33  This 
case has yet to be cited by other civil cases, but one state court has cited it 
in a criminal case to provide support for a trial court judge’s inherent 
discretion to impanel dual juries.34  Moreover, at least one state court has 
expressed approval of dual juries in civil suits.35 
B.  Authority to Order Dual Juries 
One of the most common arguments made by defendants against 
multiple juries is that courts lack the authority to employ them.36  Courts 
offer several explanations for rejecting this claim.  Most are rooted in 
procedural rules, but some courts have also advanced policy reasons. 
Many courts have found that authority for dual juries lies in their 
classification as a partial form of severance.37  Courts have held that the 
                                                                                                                          
29 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 303 F. Supp. 2d 971, 973 (C.D. Ill. 2004). 
30 Id. at 973–74. 
31 Judge Posner also wrote the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 
1151 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that dual juries do not violate the due process clause.  Id. 
at 1152. 
32 High Fructose Corn Syrup, 361 F.3d at 441. 
33 Id.  For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in High Fructose Corn Syrup, see 
generally Todd Lochner, Legal Note, Impaneling Multiple Juries in Civil Suits, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 226 
(2005). 
34 Woolbright v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Ark. 2004).  For further discussion of Woolbright, 
see Ralph Quanah Stewart, Annual Survey of Caselaw: Criminal Law, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 701, 707–09 (2005). 
35 Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the dual jury 
procedure was governed by statutory authority). 
36 See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting defendants’ 
argument that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in impaneling two juries); People v. Trice, 
577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial 
court was not authorized to permit dual juries since Illinois courts have sanctioned the procedure); State 
v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 732 (Me. 1991) (rejecting defendant’s argument that there is no statutory 
authorization for a dual-trial four-jury procedure); Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 506 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s argument that Oklahoma law precluded the court from using dual 
juries). 
37 See United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 689–90 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that the district court 
granted severance but impaneled two juries); People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Mich. 1994) 
(finding that the use of dual juries is a partial form of severance); People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 
1336, 1338  (N.Y. 1989) (concluding that “the use of multiple juries is merely a partial form of 
severance” and citing other courts that have reasoned the same); State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 909 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (agreeing with the State’s argument that “because a single trial to multiple juries 
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same purpose of, and protection provided by, severance is preserved in the 
multiple jury system.38  The primary purpose of severance is to avoid 
confusion over which evidence applies to which defendant.  In a dual jury 
trial conducted correctly, each jury only hears evidence applicable to its 
respective defendant.  In addition, when one codefendant makes an out-of-
court confession incriminating another codefendant, but then refuses to 
testify, the latter defendant’s right to confrontation is implicated.  This is 
because the codefendant who has been incriminated cannot then confront 
his accuser—his codefendant—since that codefendant does not take the 
stand.  Severance thus preserves defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights in 
such scenarios.39  Because total severance is within the sound discretion of 
the trial judge,40 it follows that partial severance is also within the court’s 
discretion. 
An alternative source of authority for multiple juries stems from 
federal rules and many states’ procedural rules providing whatever relief 
justice requires in joint trials.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
permit the court to sever defendants’ trials—or “provide any other relief 
that justice requires”41—if there is prejudice from joinder.  Some state 
rules also have such a clause.42  In fact, this provision has also been used 
by a state court to approve the use of four juries in a dual trial.43  A state’s 
ability to use this provision, however, would depend upon the language of 
the rule.44 
Another way that courts authorize multiple juries is by citing the 
traditional preference for joint trials and that impaneling dual juries 
preserves this practice.  Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allows joinder of defendants if both defendants “are alleged to 
have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of 
acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.”45  States’ rules of 
                                                                                                                          
provides the individual defendants with the same protection they receive in separate trials, the dual jury 
trial should be considered a form of severance”). 
38 See, e.g., Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 909. 
39 See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing avoidance of the Bruton problem as a rationale for 
permitting dual juries). 
40 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., ME. R. CRIM. P. 8(d) (authorizing the court to “provide whatever . . . relief justice 
requires”); see also People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding statutory 
authority for a dual jury joint trial in the state’s code of criminal procedure that grants courts discretion 
to “provide any other relief as justice may require” in the face of prejudice to the defendant). 
43 State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 733 (Me. 1991). 
44 In State v. Avery, for example, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin cited the State’s argument in 
the alternative that the dual jury procedure was authorized by “other relief justice requires” in a state 
statute.  571 N.W.2d 907, 909 n.3 (Wis. 1997). The court, however, acknowledged the defendant’s 
counterargument that the language of the statute did not appear to provide this authorization where 
mandatory severance was required in the case of a codefendant’s confession.  Id. 
45 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). 
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criminal procedure also explicitly provide for joint trials.46  Whether to try 
defendants accused of crimes arising from the same transaction together or 
separately is within the discretion of the trial court,47 and generally, courts 
have expressed a preference for joint trials of codefendants.48  Further, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the “vital role”49 that joinder plays in the 
criminal justice system:  joint trials “conserve state funds, diminish 
inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in 
bringing those accused of crime to trial.”50  
Dual juries are particularly favored when there is admissible evidence 
against one defendant that is inadmissible against the other defendant.51  
The procedure allows the removal of the defendant’s jury against whom 
the evidence is inadmissible.  Accordingly, the evidence against each 
defendant is exactly the same as the evidence would have been had the 
defendants been tried separately.52  This admissibility difficulty is known 
as the “Bruton” problem and is discussed below.53 
Finally, courts have found authority to impanel dual juries in the 
inherent discretion vested in courts to address increasing case loads on 
their dockets and have looked favorably upon innovative efforts to do so.  
When the Ninth Circuit first upheld dual juries in 1972, it cited the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning in a case holding that the decision of whether to allow 
dispersal of a jury while deliberation on the verdict is in progress is within 
the discretion of the trial judge:  “[F]air new procedures, which tend to 
facilitate proper fact finding, are allowable, although not traditional.”54  
This has been the foundation for other courts’ reasoning that their 
                                                                                                                          
46 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.3(b), (c); ME. R. CRIM. P. 8(c); see also State v. Anderson, 409 
A.2d 1290, 1297 (Me. 1979) (noting that “joint trials are generally favored in the interest of conserving 
judicial resources, avoiding duplicative trials, minimizing the public expenditure of funds and promptly 
bringing the accused to trial”). 
47 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Court’s Authority to Consolidate and Sever, 5 CRIM. PROC. § 17.3(a) 
(3d ed. 2009). 
48 See Carr v. Warren, No. 05-CV-73763-DT, 2007 WL 2389816, at *7 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007) 
(citing that courts favor joint trials); State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *6 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2000) (“The trial court’s sua sponte order [to impanel dual juries for the codefendants] 
recognized that the joinder of defendants is the rule rather than the exception because the law favors 
avoiding multiple trials.”). 
49 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987). 
50 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968); see also Robert O. Dawson, Joint Trials of 
Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379, 
1381–97 (1979) (discussing the efficiencies and other benefits of joint trials). 
51 See infra note 80 (noting that both federal and state jurisdictions have used multiple juries to 
remedy Bruton problems). 
52 See State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that the evidence 
before the defendant’s jury at his dual jury trial was exactly what it would have been had he had his 
own trial). 
53 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
54 United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Byrne v. Matczak, 254 
F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1958)). 
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discretion encompasses the use of multiple juries.55  As one Florida state 
judge wrote, “[t]he law is, and must be, dynamic and not static.  Procedural 
law is no exception.”56  Such “flexibility and discretion”57 afforded to 
judges benefits the judicial process.  Dual juries—it has been concluded—
are merely a case-by-case “‘exercise of an individual judge’s discretion to 
use a particular technique in order to meet a specific problem.’”58  At least 
one state appellate court has even upheld the dual jury procedure when 
ordered by the judge sua sponte, finding that “it is fundamental that the 
trial court may control its own docket and courtroom proceedings.”59 
C.  Standard of Review 
Since many courts find that impaneling dual juries is a form of partial 
severance,60 they apply the standard of review for severance to dual jury 
trials.  Reviewing courts evaluate whether there has been “identifiable 
prejudice or ‘gross unfairness . . . such as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial or due process of law.’”61  All federal circuits that have evaluated the 
dual jury procedure have held that it is not a per se violation of due 
process.62  Rather, courts require a showing of specific prejudice and have 
held that a generalized claim of prejudice is not sufficient to prove 
deprivation of rights.63  The Seventh Circuit has gone further in requiring a 
showing of specific and undue prejudice to the defendant from the use of 
multiple juries.64  In assessing whether there has been prejudice, courts 
look to whether juries were confused or were unable to render their verdict 
fairly and whether the trial court adequately instructed the juries about 
                                                                                                                          
55 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 610 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.P.R. 1985); People v. Brooks, 
285 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
56 Feeney v. State, 359 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
57 Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ariz. 1992). 
58 Id. at 1011 (quoting State v. Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 16 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman, J., concurring)). 
59 State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2000). 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 37–40 (discussing the authority for dual juries as stemming 
from courts’ power to sever cases). 
61 People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 35 (Cal. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. 
Turner, 690 P.2d 669, 675 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 
1306, 1309 (Cal. 1987)); see also People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Mich. 1994) (“The dual-jury 
procedure should be scrutinized with the same concern in mind that tempers a severance motion, i.e., 
whether it has prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.”). 
62 See supra note 14 (citing circuit court cases that have affirmed convictions of defendants tried 
by the use of double juries); see also State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting 
that “[n]o other jurisdiction has determined that severance by using dual juries is per se prejudicial”). 
63 See United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that appellants had 
not alleged “any more than a generalized possibility of harm”); People v. Knight, 486 N.E.2d 1356, 
1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding a triple-jury procedure when defendant failed to allege any 
specific prejudice). 
64 Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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their role.65  In applying this standard, the vast majority of courts have 
upheld convictions,66 even while criticizing the practice.67 
D.  Rationales Provided for Impaneling Dual Juries 
There are three reasons courts have impaneled dual juries.  The first is 
to avoid the so-called Bruton problem when a defendant makes an out-of-
court statement about one of his or her codefendants and the defendant 
who made the confession does not testify.  The second is to grant partial 
severance based on antagonistic defenses.  The third is to promote judicial 
economy. 
During the joint trial of defendants Evans and Bruton—both accused 
of armed postal robbery—a postal inspector testified that Evans had 
confessed that he and Bruton committed the robbery.68  At the end of the 
government’s case, the trial judge instructed the jury that the postal 
inspector’s testimony was admissible against only Evans and not Bruton 
since it was hearsay, explaining that “[a] confession made outside of court 
by one defendant may not be considered as evidence against the other 
defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to the confession.”69  
Both Evans and Bruton were convicted.70  On appeal, the circuit court set 
aside Evans’s conviction, finding that the confession should not have been 
admitted against him.71  Conversely, Bruton’s conviction was affirmed.72  
In so holding, the circuit court relied on the trial judge’s limiting 
instruction to the jury to disregard the hearsay testimony.73  Bruton 
appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that 
despite the judge’s instruction, the incrimination “posed a substantial threat 
to [Bruton’s] right to confront the witnesses against him [guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment] . . . . The effect [wa]s the same as if there had been no 
instruction at all.”74   
                                                                                                                          
65 See, e.g., People v. Mack, 606 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no indication of 
confusion or unfairness in the jury’s decision and concluding that the trial judge’s instructions were 
adequate). 
66 See supra note 14 (citing cases that have upheld convictions, finding no prejudice). 
67 See supra note 16 (citing cases that have upheld convictions, yet criticized the use of dual 
juries); cf. People v. Brown, 624 N.E.2d 1378, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that defendant was 
prejudiced by dual juries when testimony and closing argument confused portions of one defendant’s 
confession with his codefendant’s confession); People v. Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (Sup. Ct. 
2002) (holding that the potential benefits of multiple juries were outweighed by the potential prejudice 
and thus denying the State’s application for a multiple jury trial); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 
468 (Tenn. 2002) (expressly refusing to condone dual juries in Tennessee and finding no abuse of 
discretion when the trial court denied dual jury trial). 
68 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968). 
69 Id. at 125 n.2. 
70 Id. at 124. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 124–25. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 137. 
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This holding called into question the ability of courts to hold joint 
trials.  If a defendant did not testify, any out-of-court confessions she made 
implicating other defendants would be inadmissible against her 
codefendants and thus could not be heard by the jury at a joint trial.  Three 
solutions emerged to address this dilemma, which became known as the 
Bruton problem.  First, the court could completely exclude the confession 
at the joint trial.75  A confession, however, is often valuable evidence, and 
this option may come at the expense of the state’s ability to prove its case.   
Second, the court may delete from the confession any references to the 
codefendant against whom the confession is inadmissible.76  Unfortunately, 
this can still lead to prejudice, particularly in the context of oral testimony.  
The Supreme Court in Bruton addressed the inherent difficulty in these 
circumstances: 
Where the confession is offered in evidence by means of oral 
testimony, redaction is patently impractical. To expect a 
witness to relate X’s confession without including any of its 
references to Y is to ignore human frailty. Again, it is 
unlikely that an intentional or accidental slip by the witness 
could be remedied by instructions to disregard.77 
The third method to address a Bruton problem is to sever the 
defendants’ trials.78  This ignores the preference for joint trials, however, 
and can lead to inefficient usage of time and money due to unnecessary 
duplication of much of the same evidence.   
A few years after the Bruton ruling, a fourth option emerged that did 
not require the prosecutor to forego using a defendant’s out-of-court 
confession, delete any references, or waste time or money conducting two 
separate trials; the court could order the defendants tried in a joint trial, but 
by separate juries.79  In a multiple jury trial, only the jury that is 
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant who made the out-of-
court statement is present when it is admitted to the court.  This allows a 
                                                                                                                          
75 DONALD S. VOORHEES, MANUAL ON RECURRING PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 156 
(Genevra Kay Loveland ed., 5th ed. 2001). 
76 Id. 
77 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10 (quoting Note, Codefendants’ Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 80, 88 (1967)); see also id. (citing cases where courts required deletions of references to 
codefendants where practicable and law journal articles criticizing the efficacy of such deletions).  The 
holding in Bruton was further clarified by two subsequent Supreme Court rulings addressing redacted 
confessions.  In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
is not violated when a redaction eliminates any reference to a codefendant’s existence when paired with 
a limiting instruction.  481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).  In Gray v. Maryland, the Court held that redactions 
replacing the defendant’s name with blank spaces or deletions violate Bruton because the jury will 
almost certainly realize that the deletion refers to a codefendant and thus will know of the existence of 
the defendant in relation to the confession.  523 U.S. 185, 192–95 (1998). 
78 VOORHEES, supra note 75, at 156. 
79 Id. 
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joint trial but alleviates any need for redaction and insufficient limiting 
instruction to a jury.  In order to avoid a Bruton problem by using multiple 
juries, however, the prosecution must anticipate beforehand whether it will 
introduce testimony potentially contradictory to the holding in Bruton.  
Nevertheless, prosecutors in criminal trials often have all the evidence 
against defendants prior to a trial and thus should be able to make a motion 
for multiple juries.80 
The second rationale advanced for multiple juries is that the defendants 
plan to present antagonistic defenses.  Antagonistic defenses are present 
“when one person’s claim of innocence is predicated solely on the guilt of 
a co-defendant.”81  When multiple defendants are tried together, a 
defendant has the right to request a severance if he believes his defense is 
antagonistic to that of his codefendant to the extent that he would not 
receive a fair trial.82  In a joint trial, a defendant has the added burden of 
defending against both the government’s case and any accusatory aspect of 
his codefendants’ statements.83  Dual juries alleviate this burden by 
providing each defendant with a jury that has heard only the evidence 
against him, and forces the prosecution to prove its case rather than 
allowing the jury to “convict[] one defendant through the efforts of the 
other.”84  It is important to note, however, that courts often differ in their 
definitions of antagonistic defenses.85  Finger-pointing alone or mere 
inconsistencies in defenses is usually insufficient; the defenses must be 
mutually exclusive.86 
                                                                                                                          
80 See United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing that the prosecutor sought 
to introduce testimony against one of the codefendants that was inadmissible under Bruton and that the 
court’s response was to hold a joint trial before two juries rather than sever the cases).  Both federal and 
state jurisdictions have used multiple juries to remedy Bruton problems.  See, e.g., id.; People v. 
Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (N.Y. 1989) (impaneling two juries over the objections of both the 
People, who wanted a joint trial with one jury, and the defendants, who wanted total severance, in order 
to remedy a Bruton problem). 
81 Barron v. Renico, No. 04-CV-73788, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2006) 
(quoting United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
82 People v. Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253, 261 (Ill. 1992) (upholding trial court’s decision to impanel 
dual juries based on the antagonistic defenses of both defendants); see also Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d at 
1339 (N.Y. 1989) (finding cases involving antagonistic defenses as particularly attractive to employ 
multiple juries). 
83 Dawson, supra note 50, at 1422; see also People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1979) (reasoning that a joint trial allows a state to “‘pit[] one defendant against the other, each 
trying to save himself at the detriment of the other’” (quoting People v. Hurst, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Mich. 
1976))). 
84 Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308. 
85 See Dawson, supra note 50, at 1423–26.  See generally Michele Meyer McCarthy, Annotation, 
Antagonistic Defenses as Ground for Separate Trials of Codefendants in State Homicide Offenses—
Applicable Standard and Extent of Antagonism Required, 24 A.L.R.6th 591 (2007) (discussing 
differing applicable standards for determining whether antagonistic defenses warrant severance and the 
extent of antagonism required under the applicable standard). 
86 See Barron, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (“The mere fact that each defendant points the finger at 
another is insufficient [to require severance]; the defendant must show that the antagonism confused 
the jury” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1988))); 
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The final rationale proposed for using multiple juries is to advance 
judicial economy, which is most often an underlying concern when dual 
juries are used under one of the two foregoing rationales.  The American 
Bar Association87 and the Eleventh Circuit88 have endorsed the use of dual 
juries for the purpose of promoting judicial economy.  The Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned:  “Contrary to the stance of our appellants, who would 
impugn such concerns for judicial economy as illegitimate, we applaud 
innovative efforts to resolve the overwhelming obstacles facing trial 
judges, particularly in the context of multi-defendant, multi-count cases.”89  
Indeed, there was a savings of eighty-six pages of testimony transcript that 
would have been repeated had there been two separate trials in the case 
before the Eleventh Circuit.90  In the next section, the advantages of 
impaneling dual juries, including the promotion of judicial economy, are 
discussed further.  
III.  THE CASE FOR DUAL JURIES 
This Part examines the many advantages to impaneling dual juries.  
Courts’ concerns regarding the practice as well as defendants’ arguments 
against the procedure are also discussed.  The advantages clearly outweigh 
any concerns expressed by courts, and as discussed, defendants’ arguments 
have been rejected absent a showing of specific prejudice.  Dual juries 
have been challenged on numerous occasions by numerous defendants yet 
courts continue to uphold the procedure.91  Courts should recognize the 
strong legal foundation that dual juries have earned over the years and 
should endorse the procedure for future cases. 
A.  Advantages 
There are three advantages to using simultaneous juries during a joint 
trial.  The primary benefit is to promote judicial economy by saving time 
and money of two trials and making it more convenient for witnesses to 
testify.  Second, some courts have found that dual juries reduce prejudice 
against defendants present in traditional joint trials.  Finally, where there 
are victims, dual juries relieve the victims’ families of sitting through more 
than one trial and allow the victim to testify only once. 
                                                                                                                          
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 820 (2010) (discussing the varying degrees of antagonism necessary to 
warrant severance). 
87 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 20 (2005), available 
at www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (“Dual juries also may be used in order to 
promote judicial economy by presenting otherwise duplicative evidence in a single trial.”). 
88 United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1367 n.4. 
91 See infra Part III.C (discussing courts’ overwhelming rejection of defendants’ arguments 
against dual juries). 
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Judicial economy is one of the predominant advantages that courts 
have cited for impaneling dual juries.  The procedure allows the court 
system to realize the financial benefits of joint trials despite the need for 
separate juries.  The Supreme Court acknowledged in Bruton v. United 
States that “[j]oint trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience 
to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those 
accused of crime to trial.”92  In order to realize these benefits, much of the 
evidence should be the same.93  It is not clear that there is a percentage of 
evidence that must overlap, but the charges against the defendants should 
arise from the same transaction, and sources have quantified adequate 
commonalities of evidence at seventy-five percent94 and ninety percent.95  
Indeed, when a substantial majority of the evidence against all defendants 
overlaps, dual juries preserve the preference for joinder and prevent 
“needless duplication.”96  For instance, in the first New York state court 
case to utilize dual juries, the court of appeals held that “[t]he risk of error 
arising from the procedure was clearly outweighed by judicial economy” 
when “the trial involved over 25 witnesses, five of them reconstruction 
experts.”97   
Avoiding unnecessary expenditures of time and money are significant 
considerations,98 particularly in jurisdictions with large dockets, and should 
                                                                                                                          
92 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968). 
93 See McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 
10, 2009) (“Because virtually all of the other evidence appeared to be admissible against both 
Petitioner and Hedlund, however, the judge ordered that dual juries would be impaneled to hear the 
case.”); Carr v. Warren, No. 05-CV-73763-DT, 2007 WL 2389816, at *8 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007) 
(“[Codefendants’] joint trial involved numerous witnesses and substantially identical evidence.  To 
hold two trials on these substantially identical cases would have been unnecessarily duplicative and 
excessive.”); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Because a substantial 
portion of the State’s testimonial evidence proffered during the course of the proceedings was 
admissible as against all of the defendants, two simultaneous jury trials were certainly preferrable [sic] 
in the interests of judicial economy.”). 
94 Court Grants Prosecution’s Motion for Dual Juries Given the Minimal Intrusion Dual Juries 
Entails, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 2007, at 25. 
95 Thomas J. Prohaska, One Trial, Two Juries Proposed in Youth Home Slaying, BUFFALO NEWS, 
Nov. 11, 2009, at B3. 
96 Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1979) (“Things have gone quite smoothly . . . . [Impaneling dual juries] has helped the Court, 
assisted the Court in that where it has taken us four days, we have been able to handle it in a little over 
two days.”). 
97 People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989); see also Santagata, supra note 17, at 
32 (reporting that the expected benefits of the dual jury system, including reduced burden on witnesses, 
reduced costs, and an efficient use of the court’s time, were all realized in People v. Ricardo B., 535 
N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1989)).  Further, in one of the earliest state courts to examine dual juries, the Court 
of Appeals of Michigan upheld a conviction of the defendant after the trial court ordered a dual jury “in 
the interest of judicial economy.”  Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 307. 
98 See, e.g., Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ariz. 1992) (“[J]udicial process benefits 
from according flexibility and discretion to judges in their efforts to manage a large and complex 
caseload.”); Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d at 1339 (“In this day of massive caseloads and an overburdened 
criminal justice system judicial economy is not a negligible consideration and joint trials with multiple 
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not be dismissed as ancillary concerns.  Indeed, the multiple jury system’s 
innovative nature has been praised, especially in light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ostensibly open attitude toward new methods that address the 
costliness of jury trials.99  Jury trials are particularly costly; in 1976, they 
cost an estimated $3,000 per day100 and an estimate from 1999 puts the 
figure at $5,000 a day.101  Because dual juries allow one trial where 
traditionally there would be two, the procedure allows for substantial 
savings.   
Further, dual juries minimize the burden on witnesses.  By preserving a 
joint trial, witnesses need only be available for one trial and thus do not 
have to lose as much time from employment; indeed, sometimes witnesses 
are only available for one trial.102  Simultaneous juries also avoid the 
tension and strain on witnesses of having to repeat their testimony at 
separate trials103 and do not require witnesses to remember details as long 
as they would if there were two trials. 
A second reason for impaneling dual juries is that it may lessen 
prejudice to defendants in joint trials where defendants advance 
antagonistic defenses: 
Where mutually antagonistic defenses are presented in a joint 
trial, there is a heightened potential that a single jury may 
convict one defendant, despite the absence of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, in order to rationalize the acquittal of 
another.  That dilemma is not presented to dual juries.  Each 
jury is concerned only with the culpability of one defendant; 
                                                                                                                          
juries have obvious attractions, particularly in cases involving Bruton problems or antagonistic 
defenses.” (citation omitted)). 
99 Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court 
previously upheld a six-person jury in a criminal case (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 
(1970))).  Other courts have also expressed their approval of innovation.  See Lambright v. Stewart, 
191 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[M]any experiments lead to better and stronger institutions.”); 
United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e applaud innovative efforts to 
resolve the overwhelming obstacles facing trial judges, particularly in the context of multi-defendant, 
multi-count cases.”). 
100 Morris & Savitt, supra note 17, at 92. 
101 Vin Suprynowicz, Jury Trials Too Costly . . . Or Just Too Hard to Control?, ENTER STAGE 
RIGHT (Mar. 1999), http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0399jury.htm; see also Malaika 
Fraley, Dual Juries Seated in West Contra Costa County Gang Murder, Conspiracy Trial, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Oct. 27, 2010 (noting in 2010 that the cost of court staff and jury pay alone is 
about $2,950 per day in one California courthouse). 
102 See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that separate trials become “especially 
problematic in cases with recalcitrant, hard-to-locate or petrified witnesses”); Court Grants 
Prosecution’s Motion, supra note 94 (profiling People v. Bostick in which Justice Seth L. Marvin held 
that dual juries posed a minimal intrusion when the People expected to call sixteen witnesses at trial, 
four of whom would testify before both juries, and the People argued that they would only be able to 
produce the witnesses in court once). 
103 Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also Morris & Savitt, supra note 17, at 92 (“[T]he patience 
of even the most cooperative witness will start to wear thin when they are told they must return once 
more to testify at a second trial.”). 
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thus, they both can find the defendants innocent or guilty 
without the uneasiness of inconsistency that would be 
presented to a single jury in a joint trial.  The chance for 
prejudice is therefore significantly lessened.104 
Additionally, because a defendant’s jury is excused from the 
courtroom when inadmissible and potentially inculpating statements are 
made regarding the defendant, using dual juries reduces prejudice.105  The 
American Bar Association has also advocated the use of dual juries in part 
because they reduce the likelihood that juries will use evidence in an 
impermissible way.106  In addition, in his dissent in Bruton v. United States, 
Justice White emphasized that joint trials often prevent inconsistent 
verdicts against “legally indistinguishable defendants.”107  He wrote that 
codefendants often “strenuously jockey[]” to be tried first in order to avoid 
the potential unfairness of varying outcomes.108  Dual juries prevent either 
defendant from benefiting from the order in which they are tried.  For 
instance, one commentator has argued that dual juries prevent the second 
defendant from realizing the advantages of having the first trial’s 
transcript.109  In these ways, dual juries may make joint trials fairer. 
Finally, where the crime has a victim, having one trial instead of two 
may significantly lessen the emotional burden on the victim and the 
victim’s family.  A court in the district of Oklahoma recognized this 
advantage in a murder case, even informing the juries that this was one of 
the rationales for using dual juries.110  The American Bar Association has 
also recognized that dual juries reduce the emotional burden on victims 
who testify.111  Particularly in rape and murder cases, one trial is often 
emotional,112 and utilizing dual juries enables a speedier outcome rather 
than forcing families to undergo two trials.  Further, like witnesses, 
sometimes victims are only available to testify for a limited time.  For 
example, in a state court case in New Jersey, the appellate court found no 
prejudice where three juries were impaneled in one trial because of a 
                                                                                                                          
104 People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 696–97 (Mich. 1994). 
105 See McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 
10, 2009) (concluding that “‘dual juries help[ed] assure . . . compartmentalization by keeping 
dangerous evidence away from the ears of the jurors for the defendant to whom it does not apply’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999))). 
106 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY  
TRIALS (AND COMMENTARY) 106 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/ 
The_ABA_Principles_for_Juries_and_Jury_Trials.pdf. 
107 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. 
109 Santagata, supra note 17, at 32. 
110 Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1281 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d 1072, 1077–
79 (10th Cir. 2008). 
111 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 106, at 106. 
112 See Hersh, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that separate trials and thus successive testimony can 
lead to a victim’s inability to testify, particularly in sexual battery and child abuse cases). 
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Bruton problem and because the elderly victim had traveled from Puerto 
Rico to testify.113 
B.  Courts’ Concerns 
Although dual juries have been impaneled for several decades and as 
early as almost 100 years ago, courts are often reluctant to embrace the 
practice.  While courts have consistently upheld the practice, they have 
also expressed reservations and identified what they perceive as 
disadvantages to dual juries.  This Part explores three ostensible 
disadvantages and analyzes their merits. 
1.  Potential Burdens 
One of the problems that courts have discussed is the various burdens 
that dual juries appear to place on defense counsel, court reporters, and 
judges.  The Tenth Circuit has asserted that dual juries impose an added 
burden on defense counsel to ensure that no prejudicial evidence is entered 
against other defendants, thus decreasing the attention attorneys pay to 
their own clients.114  In order to prevent inadmissible evidence from being 
presented, each defendant’s counsel must inform the court whenever he or 
she is about to present evidence or a defense antagonistic to a codefendant 
so that the court may remove the codefendant’s jury.115   
Although this is an added burden in comparison to a traditional single 
jury trial, as long as most of the evidence is the same, there should only be 
a few instances where this would occur.  Further, in the case before the 
Tenth Circuit, as in most trials in which dual juries are impaneled, each 
defendant was represented by his own attorney116 who was charged with 
being watchful of potential prejudicial evidence against his own client.  
Although counsel is required to guard against prejudice affecting other 
defendants, the ultimate responsibility should be with the codefendant’s 
counsel.  While this is an additional consideration that defense counsel 
must be cautious of, any harm to defendants is purely speculative and must 
be assessed for prejudice on a case-by-case basis.117 
Further, at least one court has commented on the effect of dual juries 
on court reporters.  A Michigan state court acknowledged that there is an 
                                                                                                                          
113 State v. Hernandez, 394 A.2d 883, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
114 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Brown v. Sirmons, 515 
F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (expressing concerns about the potential for dual juries to impose 
“unique burdens” on defense counsel to anticipate the path of particular lines of questioning in order to 
ensure that no inadmissible evidence against one codefendant is admitted in the presence of a 
codefendant’s jury). 
115 Brown, 515 F.3d at 1079 (noting that counsel had to inform the judge “when his questions 
might lead to answers that would not be admissible in the codefendant’s trial”). 
116 Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1098. 
117 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the potential for increased prejudice to defendants). 
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added burden on court reporters to keep separate records of the 
proceedings.118  Ultimately, the court found that this did not outweigh the 
advantages of using dual juries and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.119 
The most significant burden imposed by using dual juries falls on the 
trial judge.  The judge is charged with addressing potentially “burdensome 
administrative problems in caring for the juries and maintaining proper 
courtroom decorum.”120  He or she is charged with ensuring the proper 
procedural safeguards so that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is not 
infringed upon by using simultaneous juries.  This includes providing the 
jury with appropriate instructions and monitoring whether the proper jury 
is present in the courtroom.  Accordingly, appeals courts examine whether 
the trial judge has taken great care in ensuring that nothing occurred during 
the trial to deprive defendants of a fair trial.121  Essentially, the trial judge 
can make or break the propriety of dual juries; while the burden is certainly 
stronger on the judge, as long as he or she is willing to show extra care, 
there is no inherent loss of rights to the defendant. 
Some courts have expressed concern that these potential additional 
burdens make dual juries unsuitable for capital trials.122  For example, the 
Tenth Circuit worried that having to monitor potential prejudice against 
codefendants “increases the already difficult job of the capital defense 
lawyer.”123  In 1992, the Supreme Court of Arizona cautioned that courts 
must be extra vigilant when employing any innovative technique in capital 
                                                                                                                          
118 People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 309 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
119 Id. at 309. 
120 People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 550–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting People v. Williams, 
No. 51870, slip op. at 4–7 (Ill. Apr. 16, 1982)); see also Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 
1893 (noting that “the trial judge must take special care in handling the juries and defense counsel”). 
121 See Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The trial court was careful and 
meticulous in its instructions.”); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating 
that the record reflected that the trial judge was meticulous in instruction and procedural mechanisms to 
keep the juries separated); United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (“The Judge 
was meticulous in explaining to the entire panel and to each jury that there would be two juries, one to 
try the guilt or innocence of Sidman and the other to try the guilt or innocence of Clifford, and 
instructed each jury not to talk to anyone about the trial and particularly not to talk to any of the other 
jurors in the other case.”); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1190–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“The 
record in the present case is replete with admonitions by the lower court to each jury that its sole 
concern was the particular offender whose guilt or innocence they would eventually determine.  The 
experienced trial judge exercised great care and patience in stressing repeatedly the nature of each 
jury’s responsibilities . . . . It is also readily apparent that the court exercised great caution in retiring 
each jury when certain inculpatory evidence not relevant to its respective case was introduced.”); 
People v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[T]he record discloses that the trial court 
thoroughly prepared the jurors for the procedure.”). 
122 In capital cases, two juries are sometimes impaneled in a different context than to try multiple 
defendants, which is the focus of this paper.  One jury is used to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant and a separate jury is impaneled to impose a sentence.  This method of employing multiple 
juries is outside the scope of this paper.  For a brief examination of dual juries in this context, see Kyle 
Wackenheim, State v. Fry:  Reconsidering Death-Qualification in New Mexico Capital Trials, 38 N.M. 
L. REV. 627, 649–52 (2008). 
123 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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cases.124  It also held, however, that approval of dual juries by the Supreme 
Court of Arizona was not required,125 thus partially overruling a previous 
case that held that capital cases are not appropriate for 
“experimentation”126 such as the use of simultaneous juries. 
Although capital cases carry the potential for the death penalty in some 
cases, such instances are not inherently different from a constitutional 
standpoint.  The Ninth Circuit127 held that any potential unreliability as a 
result of impaneling dual juries is not related to whether a capital crime is 
involved:   
Whatever additional constitutional constraints exist on the 
use of dual juries in capital trials would be a consequence of 
the greater reliability demanded of verdicts upon which a 
sentence of death is based, and not upon any additional 
uncertainty created by the fact that the trial is capital in 
nature.128   
Further, the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled any suggestion from 
previous rulings that there is a constitutional barrier to the use of dual 
juries in capital cases.129  This ruling drew a heated dissent from Judge 
Reinhardt, who argued that the potential for death changes the 
constitutional landscape and that dual juries have not been thoroughly 
tested.130  Accordingly, Judge Reinhardt argued such experimental 
measures should not be used in capital cases where the potential penalty is 
so harsh.131  He was the lone dissenter, however, and as the Tenth Circuit 
has asserted, most of the purported dangers potentially present when using 
dual juries in capital cases are also possible risks associated with all joint 
trials.132 
2.  An Inherent Risk of Prejudice? 
Another potential problem with dual juries is that the risk of prejudice 
is inherently too high.  The Supreme Court of Bronx County New York 
expressed concern about the potential prejudice stemming from a failure to 
                                                                                                                          
124 Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Ariz. 1992).  
125 Id. 
126 State v. Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 8 (Ariz. 1983), overruled in part by Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 
1011. 
127 Note that the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to examine the dual jury procedure in United 
States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1167–70 (9th Cir. 1972). 
128 Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Lambright 
v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999). 
129 Lambright, 191 F.3d at 1187. 
130 Id. at 1187–88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
131 Id. at 1188. 
132 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[M]any of the potential harms 
from a dual jury procedure, including the inadvertent introduction of prejudicial evidence against one 
defendant, are also present and possibly magnified in a trial where the defendants are tried jointly.”). 
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anticipate when a defendant’s jury needs to be excused and of the “ever-
looming risk” that an impermissible statement will be made in the presence 
of the wrong jury.133  A few other courts, particularly state courts, have 
expressed similar reluctance about the procedure.134  This is precisely the 
type of speculative reasoning, however, that has been rejected by circuit 
courts and other state courts in a demand to show specific prejudice.135  
Courts have even identified the reduction of prejudice that dual juries have 
achieved.136  Nevertheless, courts considering whether to grant a motion 
for a dual jury trial should weigh factors that may increase this risk, such 
as how many times each jury needs to be excluded from the courtroom.   
Dual juries have been impaneled for several decades across numerous 
jurisdictions and verdicts have been overturned for prejudice only a 
handful of times.137  In fact, in 1999, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “we 
now know that dual juries are in wide use and that they have worked out 
just fine.”138  The Ninth Circuit also found that any potential problems are 
not inevitable in dual juries.139  Accordingly, all federal circuits that have 
considered the procedure have upheld its constitutionality absent specific 
indicia of prejudice.140  The First Circuit has even stated that “[a] defendant 
carries the heavy burden of making a strong showing of prejudice.”141  
Further, as argued above,142 dual juries help to lessen the prejudice that is 
present in joint trials143 and thus preserve the Supreme Court’s preference 
                                                                                                                          
133 People v. Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140–41 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
134 See supra note 16 (citing cases expressing reservations about the use of dual juries). 
135 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that 
it is “impossible to identify any specific prejudice because the prejudice is to be found in the subjective 
response of the jury” and finding this argument to be mere “idle speculation” that is insufficient to 
warrant the “extraordinary relief” of overturning a jury’s verdict); State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 833 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (“The prejudice at issue must be both actual, not based on pure conjecture, and 
substantial in its impact on the defense.  Prejudice, though conceivable, remains speculative unless 
there is appreciable risk that the jury convicted the defendant for illegitimate reasons” (citation 
omitted)). 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 105–09 (discussing how dual juries reduce the risk of 
prejudice). 
137 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 624 N.E.2d 1378, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the 
defendant was prejudiced by dual juries when testimony and closing argument confused portions of one 
defendant’s confession with his codefendant’s confession); Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 140 (holding that 
the potential benefits of multiple juries were outweighed by the potential prejudice and thus denying 
the State’s application for a multiple jury trial); see also State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tenn. 
2002) (expressly refusing to condone dual juries in Tennessee and finding no abuse of discretion when 
trial court denied dual jury trial). 
138 Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). 
139 Id. at 1185, 1186. 
140 See, e.g., Mack v. Peters, 80 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996) (“For [a simultaneous trial of two 
defendants in the same courtroom before two juries] to be unconstitutional, a defendant tried in such a 
trial must show some specific, undue prejudice.”). 
141 United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 105–09 (discussing ways in which dual juries lessen 
prejudice present in joint trials). 
143 See Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d at 831 (stating in dictum that impaneling dual juries was a 
method of “minimizing any prejudice from jointly trying the defendants”). 
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for joinder. 
3.  The Potential for Confusion 
Finally, to the extent that the procedure may infringe upon defendants’ 
right to a fair trial, courts have expressed concern over potential jury 
confusion.144  Juries must know when they are supposed to be in the 
courtroom and must only hear evidence admissible against the defendant 
for whom they are responsible.  Unless specific incidents of confusion can 
be identified that are so pervasive as to render the trial unfair, courts affirm 
convictions.145 
The extent of confusion necessary to warrant reversal is demonstrated 
by People v. Brown.146  In Brown, when testifying to the jury and then 
again during closing argument, the assistant state’s attorney confused one 
defendant’s confession with another defendant’s confession.147  The 
prosecutor also referred to portions of a witness’s testimony to a jury that 
had not heard that testimony.148  In light of these mistakes, and because the 
court found that there was insufficient independent indicia to convict 
defendants without the inadmissible evidence, the court found prejudice.149 
People v. Brown, however, is an outlier, and generally, instances of 
confusion do not rise to the level of reversal.  For instance, in Ewish v. 
State,150 despite finding that the facts demonstrated how dual juries can 
become “a breeding ground for confusion in process and results alike,” any 
prejudice resulting from this confusion was insufficient for reversal due to 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt.151  In addition, in United States v. 
Rimar,152 there were moments of confusion about which jury was to be 
present and the judge and defense counsel made misstatements in referring 
                                                                                                                          
144 See, e.g., United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The primary concern 
of this court . . . was whether the unusual procedure implemented in the district court of simultaneous 
prosecutions before two juries and the judge created an atmosphere so confusing as to deprive these 
appellants of a fair trial.”); People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“Issues and 
facts before each jury, who testified before which jury, and even which jury is hearing which testimony 
can all too easily become confused.” (quoting People v. Williams, No. 51870, slip op. at 4–7 (Ill. Apr. 
16, 1982))). 
145 See, e.g., People v. Mack, 606 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no indication of 
confusion or unfairness in the jury’s decision); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1191 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1984) (“Although we recognize the possibility of confusion inherent in the multiple jury procedure, 
we find nothing in the record before us indicative of prejudicial error.”); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 
577, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[W]here there is no confusion which is so pervasive as to render the trial 
unfair, even though moments of confusion appear in the record, the two-jury procedure has been 
endorsed.”); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d 672, 674–75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no 
prejudice and thus no merit to defendant’s claim of confusion). 
146 624 N.E.2d 1378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
147 Id. at 1389. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1390. 
150 871 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994). 
151 Id. at 313, 315–16. 
152 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1977). 
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to the attorneys or their clients by incorrect names.153  Despite this, the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendants’ convictions because most of these 
misstatements took place out of the presence of the jury and the judge 
promptly corrected himself or the attorney and instructed the jury 
accordingly.154  Overall, although courts have acknowledged the potential 
for confusion, such worries have rarely come to fruition or warranted 
reversal of a defendant’s conviction. 
C.  Rejection of Defendants’ Arguments 
Defendants have frequently challenged courts’ impaneling of multiple 
juries, resorting to a wide variety of arguments in an effort to obtain 
reversal of their convictions—from the novelty of dual juries to the 
potential to jeopardize the right to a fair trial due to one jury sitting on 
harder seats than another jury.155  This section explores these arguments 
and discusses why courts have generally found that they fail to require 
reversal.  The overwhelming rejection of defendants’ arguments shows the 
strong legal foundation upon which dual juries rest.  Accordingly, courts 
should recognize and encourage this tested and beneficial legal procedure.  
1.  Constitutional Arguments 
Defendants have made several arguments against dual juries invoking 
their constitutional rights.  Many defendants have challenged the procedure 
on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds and on the basis that they 
have been deprived of their right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Still, no court has held that the use of dual juries is a per se 
constitutional violation.156  In fact, the first federal circuit to consider the 
procedure held that the defendant “enjoyed each and every right given to 
him by the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and by rule.”157  In order to 
prevail on a constitutional claim, a defendant must show that the use of 
dual juries caused a specific due process violation.158  This is generally a 
fact-specific analysis and requires the court to consider specific instances 
that a defendant can identify that caused him prejudice.   
A common challenge is that cross-examination was hindered in some 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. at 1273. 
154 Id. 
155 People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992). 
156 See Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d 1072, 
1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). 
157 United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 1972). 
158 See United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[T]his court’s task is to 
determine whether the procedure imposed by the district court comports with the basic norms of due 
process . . . . [We must] determin[e] whether any evidence indicates that the procedure specifically 
prejudiced a litigant’s defense.”); Hedlund v. Ryan, No. CV 02-110-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432739, at 
*11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009) (citing cases indicating this requirement). 
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way.159  Still, a generalized allegation of repression will not suffice.160  
Additionally, the Arizona district court rejected a challenge to cross-
examination when the evidence would have been admissible 
notwithstanding the impanelment of dual juries.161  The Tenth Circuit also 
found no merit in an argument that the defense attorney did not cross-
examine certain witnesses because he did not want to remove the jury for 
fear of causing a spectacle.162  The court rejected this argument because the 
defendant could identify no specific testimony that could have been 
presented but was not.163  On the whole, courts require particular instances 
of actual prejudice and defendants generally fail to identify any. 
In addition, in support of an alleged constitutional violation, 
defendants claim that the procedure created a conflict of interest for their 
attorneys.  For instance, in Wilson v. Sirmons, in support of his Sixth 
Amendment claim, the defendant argued that there was a conflict of 
interest by requiring his attorney to inform the court of impending potential 
prejudicial testimony.164  The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument since he 
cited no specific instances of a conflict.165  The court also reasoned that this 
additional obligation on counsel “did not diminish his presence at counsel 
table during all stages of the trial, nor did it prevent him from acting as 
counsel, as he was free to ask all questions and present all evidence.”166  
The court concluded that “[w]hatever minimal obligation he had did not 
materially limit his ability zealously to represent Mr. Wilson.”167  An 
Oklahoma appellate court also held that requiring one defendant’s counsel 
to inform the court when another defendant’s jury needs to be excused did 
not rise to the level of a conflict of interest for the attorney.168  One state 
court has also upheld a waiver of a conflict of interest made prior to the 
                                                                                                                          
159 See Hedlund, 2009 WL 2432739, at *12 (holding that petitioner provided no support for his 
allegation that cross-examination was impeded due to dual juries). 
160 See id. (rejecting petitioner’s argument that counsel “were forced to tiptoe around various 
subjects with two key witnesses . . . because of the risk of Bruton error”); Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d 1268, 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s claim that dual juries stifled cross-
examination when defendant failed to identify any specific instances of alleged stifling), aff’d 515 F.3d 
1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008); Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 507 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (finding 
insufficient defendant’s claim that cross-examination was chilled when defendant failed to cite any 
specific incidents and no indication was present that cross would have been different without the dual 
jury procedure). 
161 See, e.g., McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *8 (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 10, 2009). 
162 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1100 (10th Cir. 2008). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 507 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (“All Alverson’s lawyer had to 
do was ask the court to remove Harjo’s jury if he wanted to proceed along lines which were damaging 
to Harjo.  This is no way made him an advocate or a co-counsel for Harjo . . . .”). 
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motion to impanel dual juries.169 
Similarly, some defendants have made the argument that their counsel 
was ineffective.  For example, in State v. Avery,170 the defendant appealed 
his conviction claiming that his counsel was ineffective because the 
attorney did not object to the use of dual juries, since Wisconsin law does 
not allow for the procedure.171  The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that he did not meet the burden 
to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  According to the appellate court, Wisconsin law does, in fact, 
allow dual juries and the trial court meticulously utilized the procedure.172 
Another constitutional argument that defendants make is that juries 
were so confused that defendants’ due process rights were violated.  These 
challenges are generally rejected unless specific instances can be identified 
showing that there was pervasive confusion that robbed the defendant of a 
fair trial.173  Courts examine whether a defendant had as fair a trial using 
dual juries as she would have had were she tried alone.174 
Finally, some defendants have argued that despite impaneling dual 
juries, a Bruton violation still occurred.  These—like most other inquiries 
of prejudice—are fact-specific and depend on the admissibility of evidence 
during the trial.  For instance, the First Circuit rejected both codefendants’ 
claims of Bruton violations because the testimony at issue did not mention 
the defendant in question and the judge offered sufficient limiting 
instructions.175  In addition, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found no 
Bruton violation when one jury discovered a codefendant’s confession 
which implicated the defendant for whom they were responsible because 
the information could have been admitted without prejudice in a joint 
trial.176  Generally, courts also look at whether the defendant objected to 
the admission during trial.  If there was no objection then the court will not 
review the admission.177 
2.  Authorization 
Defendants have also challenged the procedure on the grounds that 
courts are not authorized to use dual juries.  Courts have overwhelmingly 
                                                                                                                          
169 Roberts v. State, 573 So. 2d 964, 964–65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
170 571 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
171 Id. at 908. 
172 Id. 
173 See discussion supra Part III.B.3 for courts’ responses to jury confusion claims. 
174 See, e.g., Barron v. Renico, No. 04-CV-73788, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 
2006) (examining admissibility of evidence presented to determine whether defendant had a fair trial). 
175 United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir. 1987). 
176 State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1340–41 (La. 1981). 
177 See, e.g., Probus v. Horel, No. EDCV 09-1470-AG(CT), 2009 WL 5195953, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 29, 2009) (“The failure to object at trial is a longstanding appellate procedural bar.”); Woolbright 
v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 322–23 (Ark. 2004) (affirming defendant’s conviction because he did not 
object to the testimony of witnesses during trial). 
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rejected this argument, whether grounded in lack of statutory authority or 
court rules.  Courts examine whether there is an express prohibition on the 
procedure, and if not, courts hold that they have the authority to impanel 
dual juries.178 
3.  Novelty 
Courts reject novelty arguments against the impanelment of dual 
juries.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that while the 
defendant called the procedure an “experiment,” this did not lend support 
to his argument since it did not inform the practice’s reliability.179  In fact, 
as other courts have found, new procedures are allowable and may even 
lead to improvements.180  Similarly, even though some courts have voiced 
criticism of the practice, defendants have been unsuccessful in raising 
courts’ disapproval as a valid argument against the procedure.  As the 
District of Columbia Circuit found, “[t]his court’s task is not to determine 
whether the district court made the optimal decision . . . to impanel two 
juries . . . . Rather this court’s task is to determine whether the procedure 
imposed by the district court comports with the basic norm of due 
process.”181  Novelty and popularity are not relevant to this determination.  
4.  Effect on Juries 
Defendants have challenged the effect of dual juries on the juries 
themselves, but courts have rejected any speculative arguments about juror 
misconduct.  For example, in People v. Cummings,182 the court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the use of dual juries led both juries to convict 
out of fear that the other jury would not convict and the murderer would go 
unpunished.183  In People v. Harris,184 the defendant challenged the dual 
jury procedure’s impact on the jury on four grounds: 
(1) it is “cumbersome” and causes inconvenience to the 
jurors; (2) by increasing the projected duration of the trial, 
[it] decreases the number of jurors on the panel from which 
the jury is to be selected who are able to serve without 
hardship and thus threatens the defendant’s right to a jury 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community; 
                                                                                                                          
178 For a more detailed examination of courts’ authority to impanel dual juries, see discussion 
supra Part II.A. 
179 Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. 
Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the argument that because the dual jury 
procedure was novel, it infringed upon the defendant’s rights); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306, 314 (Nev. 
1994) (“[N]ovelty alone is not enough to reverse appellants’ respective convictions.”). 
180 See supra note 54–55 and accompanying text. 
181 United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
182 850 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1993). 
183 Id. at 34, 36. 
184 767 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1989). 
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(3) [it] creates a danger that jurors frustrated by the delay and 
inconveniences caused by the procedure will blame the 
defendant for their discomfiture; and (4) [it] invites each jury 
to speculate that, during the time it is excluded, evidence 
damaging to the defendant whose case that jury is trying is 
being presented to the second jury.185 
All of these arguments were rejected by the court as pure speculation 
unsupported by the record.186  Specifically, the court found that jurors were 
simply informed when they needed to return to the courtroom, causing no 
inconvenience, and that any breaks in the presentation of evidence were 
not out of the ordinary.187  The court also declined to speculate about any 
potential inferences the jury may have made when it was not in the 
courtroom and noted that the jury may not have been aware that the 
codefendant’s jury was in session.188  Overwhelmingly, if the record does 
not reflect any specific instances of prejudice and the trial judge 
meticulously instructed the jury that they are not to speculate, courts will 
uphold the use of dual juries.189 
5.  Courtroom Layout and Juror Accommodations 
A common argument by defendants is that the courtroom layout or 
accommodations of the jurors was prejudicial.  Defendants have advanced 
a wide variety of claims in this area, but courts have rejected speculative 
claims regarding courtroom configuration.  Courts have found no merit in 
claims that due process rights were violated due to positioning defendants 
facing the jurors thus potentially causing intimidation,190 or by defendants 
                                                                                                                          
185 Id. at 633–34. 
186 Id. at 634. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See, e.g., Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1186 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The argument that 
each defendant’s jury will ‘necessarily speculate’ about the evidence being heard by the other 
defendant’s jury is itself rank speculation” (citing People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 634 (Cal. 1989) (en 
banc))); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to reverse defendant’s 
conviction based on defendant’s claim that jurors were speculating about why they had to leave the 
courtroom); People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992) (finding no merit in defendant’s 
argument that the jury assumed that the State properly brought charges and that the evidence the jury 
was not allowed to hear was related to its defendant); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1341–42 (La. 
1981) (rejecting the contention that the dual jury system caused jurors to speculate whether the other 
jury would reach the same conclusion in light of no claim by the defendant that the evidence did not 
support the verdict); State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 
2000) (finding no merit in defendant’s claim of the possibility of juror speculation); Alverson v. State, 
983 P.2d 498, 506–07 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the jury was left to 
improperly speculate when it was excused because defendant cited no instances showing prejudice and 
the trial judge “painstakingly” instructed the jury about the procedure); Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 
457 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (finding no merit in defendant’s argument that the jury speculated 
particularly in light of the trial court’s instructions and no indication that the jury did not adhere to 
them), aff’d in part and vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). 
190 State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1232 (Ariz. 1996). 
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being allowed to sit together and referred to as codefendants.191  Courts 
have also found no error when a defendant’s jury sat closer to the victim’s 
family than the codefendant’s jury,192 when only one jury could sit in the 
jury box at a given time,193 and when juries were able to observe each 
other.194  In addition, one court found meritless an argument that a 
defendant’s jury sat on harder seats than his codefendant’s jury.195  Further, 
“traffic jams” in the courtroom without any indication of “rowdiness or 
breach of decorum” were found not to warrant reversal.196 
Some defendants have also advanced arguments rooted in a violation 
of their right to a public trial resulting from the juries’ placement in the 
courtroom.  In the first federal circuit to examine dual juries, the defendant 
“hint[ed]” that the procedure robbed him of his right to a public trial 
because space outside the jury box was occupied by jurors.197  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this argument, however, because the jury was within the 
space reserved for counsel and “did not in the slightest encroach on any 
space reserved for the public.”198  Still, later courts upheld convictions 
when jurors sit in the audience.199  Further, in 1972, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that the argument of encroachment might gain legitimacy if three or 
four juries were present in the courtroom.200  Since then, however, courts 
have upheld the impaneling of three juries and a dual-trial four-jury 
procedure.201 
Accordingly, defendants have not been successful in challenging the 
dual jury procedure.  Courts have not held the procedure to be inherently 
prejudicial, and overwhelmingly, courts have not found it to be executed 
prejudicially.  After nearly four decades of affirming convictions, courts 
                                                                                                                          
191 People v. Trice, 577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
192 Wilson, 983 P.2d at 458. 
193 People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (Ct. App. 1981); see also People v. Brooks, 285 
N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting defendant’s challenge of the dual jury procedure 
based on the seating of one of the juries outside the jury box because “there is nothing sacrosanct in the 
placement of the jury in the jury box”). 
194 Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308–09. 
195 People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992). 
196 Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308–09. 
197 United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972). 
198 Id. 
199 See People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 630, 637 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (finding no prejudice when 
one jury was seated in the jury box and one jury was in seats normally reserved for the audience and 
the juries switched locations each week); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1339 n.2 (La. 1981) 
(finding no prejudice when one jury was seated in the jury box while the other jury was seated in the 
front row of the courtroom). 
200 Sidman, 470 F.2d at 1170. 
201 People v. Knight, 486 N.E.2d 1356, 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding no violation of 
defendant’s rights from a triple-jury trial); State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 732, 734 (Me. 1991) 
(finding proper discretion for trial court to use dual-trial four-jury procedure); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 
306, 316 (Nev. 1994) (finding no prejudice from the three-jury procedure); State v. Hernandez, 394 
A.2d 883, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding no prejudice from the impaneling of three 
separate juries). 
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should recognize the solid legal foundation upon which dual juries rest.  To 
provide further legal support for the procedure, the next Part proposes 
detailed model guidelines that jurisdictions should adopt to help ensure that 
dual juries continue to be implemented efficiently and justly. 
IV.  MODEL GUIDELINES FOR IMPANELING MULTIPLE  
JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS 
Since the Ninth Circuit upheld the dual jury procedure almost forty 
years ago, there have been many calls for guidelines, including by the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sidman.202  Only a few limited sources 
have suggested any guidance for trial courts.203  For example, in 1997, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma adopted the following guidelines 
for impaneling dual juries: 
Guideline 2. Impaneling Dual Juries. 
In a case where co-defendants are charged, the trial court 
may, at its discretion, order two juries impaneled, one for 
each co-defendant. Both juries will be seated in the jury box 
and the evidence pertaining to both defendants will be 
presented to both juries simultaneously. Evidence admissible 
as to one co-defendant shall be presented to that defendant’s 
jury only. 
Comment: This procedure is intended to balance, in 
appropriate cases, defendants’ rights to separate trials and 
speedy trials, and concerns of fairness and judicial 
economy.204   
Although these guidelines are a good starting point, they are brief and 
                                                                                                                          
202 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Although we uphold the trial by two juries in this case, 
we think that unless some guidelines are established by court rule at the District Court level . . . our 
holding is not to be read as an endorsement of the ‘experiment’ that was carried out in this case.”); see 
also Woolbright v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 324–25 (Ark. 2004) (“[W]e condemn the practice and 
prohibit the use of dual juries until such time as a rule has been implemented to specifically address the 
practical considerations necessary for safeguarding the defendants’ rights.”); Watson, 397 So. 2d at 
1342 (discouraging dual juries until guidelines are incorporated into Louisiana’s Code of Criminal 
Procedure); Ewish, 871 P.2d at 316 (“Without guidelines authorized by this court or sanction from our 
state’s legislature, the courts of this state are instructed to refrain from conducting [multiple jury] trials 
in this manner.”); Hernandez, 394 A.2d at 886 (suggesting that dual juries be studied by a committee of 
the state supreme court); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tenn. 2002) (“We do not condone the 
practice in Tennessee at this time when no rule has been implemented to specifically address the 
practical considerations necessary for safeguarding defendants’ rights under the multiple jury 
procedure.”). 
203 For a discussion of potential guidelines, see Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011–13 
(Ariz. 1992); Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291–92; Hersh, supra note 17, at 73–74; Robert E. Larsen, 
NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL TRIAL § 3:42 (2010); Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893 
n.99. 
204 Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211, 213 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
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do not address the myriad issues with which a trial judge may have to 
contend.205  The following proposed guidelines are meant to be applicable 
to any jurisdiction that wishes to have detailed procedural safeguards to 
ensure that judicial economy is preserved without compromising 
defendants’ constitutional rights.  Such guidelines may be incorporated 
into a district court’s rules or a state’s code of criminal procedure. 
A.  Guidelines for Impaneling Multiple Juries in Joint Trials 
This court/code recognizes that in the interest of judicial economy and 
to avoid unnecessary duplication and expenditure of the court’s resources, 
multiple juries may be impaneled.  Such a procedure, however, must meet 
the dual goals of conserving court resources and preserving defendants’ 
constitutionally protected rights.  At all times, the court must remember 
that justice takes priority over judicial economy.206 
In order to assess whether a multiple jury procedure is appropriate for 
a case, the judge must try to determine how much of the evidence against 
the defendants overlaps.  A significant majority of the evidence should be 
common to the defendants.207  Further, with the assistance of counsel, the 
judge should attempt to estimate how many times each jury must be 
excluded from the courtroom.208  Excessive removal may negate any time 
saving advantages of the procedure and could lead to confusion. 
1.  Voir Dire 
There should be a separate and perhaps mutually exclusive voir dire 
for each jury.209  The defendant and the defendant’s counsel should be 
present throughout the selection of his jury.  Any codefendants should only 
be present briefly to ensure that no jurors on any jury know the 
defendants.210  Any jurors who are selected to serve on the first jury should 
be excused while selection of the remaining juries is completed.  During 
                                                                                                                          
205 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, which adopted the guidelines just a year earlier, 
remarked in 1998 that “[v]ery little guidance was given to trial courts in the implementation of [dual 
juries].”  Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 456 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998), aff’d in part and vacated in part 
by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). 
206 United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[J]ustice, not judicial economy, is 
the first principle of our legal system.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 
1385, 1388 (6th Cir. 1974))). 
207 For a list of cases in which the court noted the importance of substantial overlap in the 
evidence against all defendants, see supra note 93. 
208 People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 632–33 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (noting that one jury was 
removed three times while the other jury was excused five times); Santagata, supra note 17, at 32 
(noting that this is a “crucial determination” and that in People v. Ricardo B., the juries were excused 
eleven times). 
209 See Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Ariz. 1992); Hersh, supra note 17, at 73; Note, 
Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893 n.99; cf. People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 697 (Mich. 
1994) (finding no prejudice where a single jury venire was used). 
210 Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012. 
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the voir dire, the judge should explain that there will be more than one 
defendant on trial but that each jury will be responsible for the 
determination of the guilt or innocence of only one defendant.  The jury is 
not to consider or speculate on the guilt or innocence of any other 
defendant.  During the trial, each jury may be excused and should not 
speculate about the reasons for removal.211  The judge should ask each 
prospective juror whether there is anything about this procedure that would 
hinder his or her ability to follow the judge’s instructions.212   
Separation of the venires is particularly important when defendants are 
presenting antagonistic defenses.213  Great care must be taken to avoid 
exposing one defendant’s jury to the antagonistic defense of another 
codefendant. 
2.  Explanation to the Jury 
Each jury should receive separate explanations as to the procedure 
prior to the start of the trial.  Each should be informed whose guilt or 
innocence it is charged with determining.  The juries should be told that 
they will not be present at all times in the courtroom but that they are not to 
speculate as to why they are excused or about evidence presented while 
they are gone.214  They should also be told to carefully adhere to any 
instruction that the judge provides and not to draw any inferences from the 
fact that the defendants are seated at one table.215  The judge should also 
explain to them why the court is conducting the procedure, particularly that 
it will save the court time and money. 
3.  Opening and Closing Statements 
Each jury should be given separate opening statements.216  Closing 
statements may be separate or together depending on whether or not 
counsel plans to reference evidence inadmissible against one defendant.217  
No references to other defendants should be made.  Counsel and the judge 
must ensure that counsel does not mention evidence inadmissible to the 
defendant or that was not presented to that defendant’s jury. 
                                                                                                                          
211 See, e.g., Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1281–82 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d 
1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008). 
212 Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 457 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1998) (noting that trial court explicitly asked both juries if they could assure the court that they would 
not infer or speculate about what evidence is being presented while outside the courtroom), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). 
213 Hana, 524 N.W.2d at 709 (Levin, J., dissenting). 
214 Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012. 
215 People v. Trice, 577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that defendant was not 
prejudiced by sitting at the same table as his codefendant at trial); Santagata, supra note 17, at 32. 
216 See, e.g., Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012. 
217 Hersh, supra note 17, at 74. 
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4.  Exhibits 
Each jury should receive a copy of the exhibits admissible against their 
defendant.218  This will decrease the chances that one jury will speculate 
about the deliberations of the other.219  Any exhibits that are not capable of 
duplication should be distributed between the juries per request and 
discretion of the trial judge. 
5.  Presentation of Evidence 
A jury should only be present in the courtroom if the evidence 
presented is admissible against its defendant.  As a result, the trial court 
and counsel must do their best to predict when inadmissible evidence will 
be presented against one defendant in order to excuse that defendant’s jury 
prior to the admission of this evidence.  The ideal procedure is for the 
judge to review with counsel which jury—or juries—to bring back to the 
courtroom prior to calling the next witness.220  Although this is an extra 
burden on defense counsel and the trial court judge,221 if each is vigilant 
and takes extra care to anticipate lines of questioning, each jury should 
only hear the evidence that it is permitted to hear.  If inadmissible evidence 
is presented by accident in front of a defendant’s jury, the trial judge must 
determine whether the error is capable of being corrected through 
instruction, and, if appropriate, provide the jury with a proper limiting 
instruction.222  Ultimately, the discretion rests with the trial judge.  The 
goal is to ensure that the evidence against one defendant is the same in the 
joint trial as if he or she would have had a trial alone.223 
6.  Direct Examination and Cross-Examination 
Normal direct examination should occur unless evidence requires 
otherwise.224  The trial judge has the discretion to hold direct examination 
separately for each defendant or to allow all juries to be present.  Of 
course, a jury must be excused if any evidence inadmissible against its 
defendant is about to be presented.225  The court and attorneys should also 
                                                                                                                          
218 Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012; Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291; Gary Muldoon, Dual (Multiple) 
Jury Trials May Be Held, HANDLING A CRIM. CASE IN N.Y. § 14:19 (2009). 
219 Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291. 
220 State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. 1997) (“Prior to resuming testimony and before 
bringing the panels into the courtroom, the court reviewed with counsel whether both or only one panel 
should be brought in for the next witness.”). 
221 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that the trial 
judge instructed the jury accordingly when misstatements occurred during defendant’s dual jury trial 
and thus the trial was not unfair). 
223 See People v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding no prejudice when 
defendant was “given every opportunity to present a complete defense before one jury, coterminous 
with what would have attached had there been no co-defendant”). 
224 Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. 1992). 
225 See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the Bruton problem). 
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be aware of antagonistic defenses.  During cross-examination, only the jury 
of the defendant whose case it pertains to, whether just one defendant or all 
defendants, should be present.226 
7.  Errors 
If any error occurs during the proceedings, the judge must use his or 
her discretion to determine whether such error may be corrected with 
proper limiting instruction227 or if a mistrial is necessary.228  Examples of 
such errors include bringing the wrong jury back into the courtroom; 
counsel, the trial court judge, or a witness calling the defendant by a 
codefendant’s name; or presentation of evidence in front of a defendant’s 
jury that is inadmissible against that defendant. 
8.  Repeated Admonishments 
It is essential that the trial judge repeat the instructions to the jury of its 
role in the proceeding.  The judge must continually remind the jury that it 
must only consider the guilt or innocence of its defendant; that even though 
all defendants will be in the courtroom, the jury may draw no inference 
regarding an association between them; and that no speculation must be 
made regarding the reasons for removal or any other aspect of the 
procedure.  It is hard to imagine that such instructions could ever be 
excessively repeated.229 
9.  Court Reporter 
The court reporter should, to the extent possible, keep separate records 
of the proceedings and must note which jury or juries are present.230 
10.  Jury Instructions 
It is within the trial judge’s discretion to hold joint jury instructions, in 
whole or in part, if he or she determines it will comport with defendants’ 
                                                                                                                          
226 People v. Leak, 925 N.E.2d 264, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (noting that cross-examination of the 
State’s witness was conducted separately); Hersh, supra note 17, at 74 (asserting that “[t]he better 
practice, especially when a defense attorney seeks to emphasize greater culpability of a codefendant, 
would be for only the cross-examining defendant’s jury to be present”). 
227 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (“It is not unreasonable to conclude that in 
many such cases [in which inadmissible evidence is admitted] the jury can and will follow the trial 
judge’s instructions to disregard such information.”). 
228 Id. (“[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and 
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 833 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the trial court informed the State that the defendant would receive a 
mistrial if any inadmissible statements were heard by the defendant’s jury). 
229 People v. Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d 179, 181 (N.Y. 1994) (indicating that the trial judge repeated 
over twenty times the instructions that the jury was not to gain knowledge of the other jury’s activities 
and to avoid contact with each other). 
230 State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. 1997). 
 354 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:321 
rights.231  Defendants should not be referred to together in the jury 
instructions, either by the use of “and/or” or other words or phrases that 
would link them together.  Jurors should be informed that they should 
consider all evidence as a whole but must remember what evidence is 
applicable to their defendant.  The juries should again be reminded not to 
speculate about reasons for their removal from the courtroom and that they 
are required adhere to all instructions given throughout the trial. 
11.  Jury Sequestration 
All juries should be sequestered from one another,232 with separate jury 
rooms and separate restrooms designated for each jury.233  Lunch should be 
at different times.  Jurors should be instructed not to contact any jurors 
from other juries even in passing.  Each jury should also be labeled to 
reduce the likelihood of confusing them.  They may wear labeled or 
colored badges.234  A single court officer should be assigned to each jury 
and should stay with the jury whenever the judge or counsel is absent from 
the courtroom.235 
Each jury may also be sequestered to prevent exposure to media 
coverage about evidence against codefendants.236  This is particularly 
important in highly publicized cases. 
12.  Courtroom Layout and Jury Accommodations 
Accommodating multiple juries in one courtroom can often be 
challenging.  Ideally, each jury would have its own jury box, but 
courtroom facilities do not always allow for this opportunity.  The goal 
should be to ensure that each jury has as adequate a view of the witnesses 
and defendants as the other jury or juries.  If two jury boxes are 
unavailable, other feasible options include: (1) one jury seated in the jury 
box and the other seated in chairs in front of237 or perpendicular238 to the 
jury box or (2) one jury seated in the jury box and one jury in seats 
                                                                                                                          
231 Compare Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d at 181 (noting that juries were instructed separately with regard 
to charges and defenses for each defendant), with People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (N.Y. 
1989) (noting that one charge was given to both juries without the use of either defendant’s name). 
232 Cf. People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding no indication of 
impropriety even though the juries were not sequestered during trial); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d 
672, 675 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no reversible error when juries stayed in the same jury 
room except during final deliberation since trial judge specifically instructed jurors not to speak to one 
another). 
233 Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 910. 
234 United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982); Larsen, supra note 203; 
Muldoon, supra note 218; Santagata, supra note 17, at 32. 
235 Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d at 181. 
236 Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 910. 
237 United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972). 
238 Santagata, supra note 17; see also id. (providing a diagram of the courtroom layout in People 
v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989)). 
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otherwise used by the audience.239  If the latter option is selected, the court 
must ensure that the jury in public seating does not occupy excessive space 
such that the defendant’s right to a public trial is infringed.240  The juries 
should switch places every other day or at an interval that the trial judge 
determines is appropriate.241   
13.  Verdict 
Each jury renders its own verdict and verdicts should be sealed until all 
are reached.242  This is particularly important in highly publicized cases.  
The jury rendering a verdict first may be sequestered until the remaining 
verdict(s) are reached.  Alternatively, they may be excused and advised 
that they may not reveal anything about the verdict until such time that the 
court contacts them rescinding the order. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined dual juries in joint trials.  It has endorsed the 
procedure and provided detailed model guidelines.  Dual juries have been 
consistently used for over forty years, yet courts continually refer to the 
procedure as novel and caution against its use.  Instances of prejudice that 
courts fear so deeply have materialized in only a handful of cases, while 
the vast majority of dual jury joint trials have gone relatively smoothly.  
Indeed, the use of dual juries allows joint trials even when all the evidence 
is not admissible against all defendants, thus preventing needless 
duplication of evidence and excessive expenditures of time and money. 
The trial judge is the most important aspect to impaneling a dual jury.  
It is within the judge’s power and responsibility to properly advise the jury 
of its role so that the defendants are not prejudiced by the procedure.  The 
judge, as well as counsel, must be vigilant throughout the trial in order to 
guard against any potentially prejudicial evidence.  These burdens increase 
as the amount of independent evidence against each defendant increases.  
Accordingly, the benefits of dual juries are only realized if there is 
substantial overlap between the evidence against all defendants.  When this 
condition is met, however, and counsel as well as the judge have 
cooperated in ensuring a fair trial, dual juries have proven to be not only 
                                                                                                                          
239 People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 630 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 
1339 n.2 (La. 1981). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 197–201 (discussing defendants’ arguments about 
infringement of right to a public trial from impaneling dual juries). 
241 See, e.g., Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. 1992) (noting in trial procedures 
that “juries will switch places every other day”); Harris, 767 P.2d at 630 (noting that juries changed 
positions every week); Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893 n.99 (suggesting that juries’ 
“positions should be rotated regularly to avoid disadvantaging one”). 
242 Hersh, supra note 17, at 74; cf. People v. Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d 179, 182–83 (N.Y. 1994) 
(holding that failure to seal verdict of first jury until second jury returned verdict was not reversible 
error). 
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workable, but valuable.  Hopefully, with the benefits outlined and the 
detailed model guidelines provided in this Note, more courts will take 
advantage of this sensible and beneficial innovation. 
